In recent years, constrained optimization has become increasingly relevant to the machine learning community, with applications including Neyman-Pearson classification, robust optimization, and fair machine learning. A natural approach to constrained optimization is to optimize the Lagrangian, but this is not guaranteed to work in the nonconvex setting, and, if using a first-order method, cannot cope with non-differentiable constraints (e.g. constraints on rates or proportions).
Introduction
We consider the general problem of inequality constrained optimization, in which we wish to find a set of parameters θ ∈ Θ minimizing an objective function subject to m functional constraints:
To highlight some of the challenges that arise in non-convex constrained optimization, consider the specific example of constraining a fairness metric. We cast the fairness problem as that of minimizing some empirical loss subject to one or more fairness constraints. One of the simplest examples of such is the following:
s.t. 1 |S| x∈Smin 1 f (x;θ)>0 ≥ 0.8 |S| x∈S 1 f (x;θ)>0
Here, f (·; θ) is a classification function with parameters θ, S is the training dataset, and S min ⊆ S represents a minority population. The constraint represents a version of the so-called "80% rule" [e.g. Biddle, 2005, Vuolo and Levy, 2013] , and forces the resulting classifier to make at least 80% of its positive predictions on the minority population- Goh et al. [2016] and Narasimhan [2018] discuss a number of useful constraints that are formulated similarly, both on fairness and non-fairness metrics. Unfortunately, several serious challenges arise when we attempt to optimize this problem:
1. The constraint is data-dependent, and could therefore be very expensive to check.
2. The classification function f may be a badly-behaving function of θ (e.g. a deep neural network), resulting in non-convex objective and constraint functions. 3. Worse, the constraint is a linear combination of indicators, hence is not even subdifferentiable w.r.t. θ.
Perhaps the most "familiar" technique for constrained optimization is to formulate the Lagrangian:
where Λ ⊆ R m + . and jointly minimize over θ ∈ Θ and maximize over λ ∈ Λ ⊆ R m + . By itself, using this formulation doesn't address the challenges we identified above, but we will see that, compared to the alternatives (Section 2.1), it's a good starting point for an approach that does.
Dealing with non-Convexity
Optimizing the Lagrangian can be interpreted as playing a two player zero-sum game: the first player chooses θ to minimize L (θ, λ), and the second player chooses λ to maximize it. The essential difficulty is that, without strong dualityequivalently, unless the minimax theorem holds, giving that min θ∈Θ max λ∈Λ L (θ, λ) = max λ∈Λ min θ∈Θ L (θ, λ)-then the θ-player, who is working on the primal (minimax) problem, and the λ-player, who is working on the dual (maximin) problem, might fail to converge to a solution satisfying both players simultaneously (i.e. a pure Nash equilibrium).
If Equation 1 is a convex optimization problem and the action spaces Θ and Λ are compact and convex, then the minimax theorem holds [von Neumann, 1928] , and optimizing the Lagrangian will work. Otherwise it might not, and in fact it's quite easy to construct a counterexample: Figure 1 shows a case in which a pure Nash equilibrium of the Lagrangian game does not exist. For this reason, the standard approach for handling non-convex machine learning problems, i.e. pretending that the problem is convex and using a stochastic first order algorithm anyway, should not be expected to reliably converge to a pure Nash equilibrium-even on a problem as trivial as that in Figure 1 -since there may be none for it to converge to.
Under general conditions, however, even when there is no pure Nash equilibrium, a mixed equilibrium (i.e. a pair of distributions over θ and λ) does exist. Such an equilibrium defines a stochastic classifier: upon receiving an example x to classify, we would sample θ from its equilibrium distribution, and then evaluate the classification function f (x; θ). Furthermore, and this is our first main contribution, this equilibrium can be taken to consist of a discrete distribution over at most m + 1 distinct θs (m being the number of constraints), and a single non-random λ. This is a crucial improvement in practical terms, since a machine learning model consisting of e.g. a distribution over thousands (or more) of deep neural networks-or worse, a continuous distribution-would likely be so unwieldy as to be unusable.
Introducing Proxy Constraints
Figure 1: The plotted rectangular region is the domain Θ, the contours are those of the strictly concave minimization objective function g 0 , and the shaded triangle is the feasible region determined by the three linear inequality constraints g 1 , . . . , g 3 . The red dot is the optimal feasible point. The Lagrangian L (θ, λ) is strictly concave in θ for any choice of λ, so the optimal choice(s) for the θ-player will always lie on the four corners of the plotted rectangle. However, these points are infeasible, and therefore suboptimal for the λ-player.
Most real-world machine learning implementations use first-order methods (even on non-convex problems, e.g. DNNs). To use such a method, however, one must have gradients, and gradients are unavailable for nondifferentiable constraints like that in the fairness example of Equation 2, or in the myriad of other situations in which one wishes to constrain counts or proportions instead of smooth losses (e.g. recall, coverage or churn as in Goh et al. [2016] ). In all of these cases, the constraint functions are piecewise-constant, so their gradients are zero almost everywhere, and a gradient-based method cannot be expected to succeed.
The obvious solution is to use a surrogate. For example, we might consider replacing the indicators of Equation 2 with sigmoids, and then optimizing the Lagrangian. This solves the differentiability problem, but introduces a new one: a (mixed) Nash equilibrium would correspond to a solution satisfying the sigmoid-relaxed constraint, instead of the actual constraint. Interestingly, it turns out that we can seek to satisfy the original un-relaxed constraint, even while using a surrogate. Our proposal is motivated by the observation that, while differentiating the Lagrangian (Definition 1) w.r.t. θ requires differentiating the constraint functions g i (θ), to differentiate it w.r.t. λ we only need to evaluate them. Hence, a surrogate is only necessary for the θ-player; the λ-player can continue to use the original constraint functions.
We refer to a surrogate that is used by only one of the two players as a "proxy", and introduce the notion of "proxy constraints" by takingg i (θ) to be a sufficiently-smooth upper bound on g i (θ) for i ∈ [m], and formulating two functions that we call "proxy-Lagrangians":
where Λ := ∆ m+1 ∋ λ is the (m + 1)-dimensional simplex.
As one might expect, the θ-player wishes to minimize L θ (θ, λ), while the λ-player wishes to maximize L λ (θ, λ). Notice that theg i s are only used by the θ-player. Intuitively, the λ-player chooses how much to weigh the proxy constraint functions, but-and this is the key to our proposal-does so in such a way as to satisfy the original constraints.
Unfortunately, because the two players are optimizing different functions, this is a non-zero-sum game, and finding a (mixed) Nash equilibrium of such games is known to be PPAD-complete even in the finite setting [Chen and Deng, 2006] . We prove, however, that a weaker type of equilibrium (a Φ-correlated equilibrium [Rakhlin et al., 2011] , i.e. a joint distribution over θ and λ w.r.t. which neither player can improve)-one that we can find efficiently-suffices to guarantee a nearly-optimal and nearly-feasible solution to Equation 1 in expectation.
Contributions
We first focus on the standard Lagrangian formulation, in the non-convex setting. In Section 3, we provide an algorithm that, given access to an approximate Bayesian optimization oracle, finds a stochastic classifier that, in expectation, is provably approximately feasible and optimal. Many previous authors have approached constrained optimization using similar techniques (see Section 2)-our main contribution is to show how such a classifier can be efficiently "shrunk" to one that is at least as good, but is supported on only m + 1 solutions.
Our next major contribution is the introduction of the proxy-Lagrangian formulation, which allows us to optimize constrained problems with extremely general (even non-differentiable) constraints. In Section 4, we prove that a particular type of Φ-correlated equilibrium results in a stochastic classifier that is feasible and optimal, and go on to provide a novel algorithm that converges to such an equilibrium. Interestingly, to get the "right" sort of equilibrium, the θ-player needs only minimize the usual external regret, but the λ-player must minimize the swap regret. While the resulting distribution is supported on a large number of (θ, λ) pairs, applying the same "shrinking" procedure as before yields a distribution over only m + 1 θs that is at least as good as the original.
Finally, in Section 5, we tie everything together by describing an end-to-end recipe for provably solving a non-convex constrained optimization problem with potentially non-differentiable constraints, yielding a stochastic model that is a supported on at most m + 1 solutions. In practice, one would use SGD instead of an oracle, which results in an efficient procedure that can be easily plugged-in to existing workflows, as is experimentally verified in Section 6.
Related Work
The interpretation of constrained optimization as a two-player game has a long history: Arora et al. [2012] surveys some such work, and there are several more recent examples [e.g. Kearns et al., 2017 , Narasimhan, 2018 , Agarwal et al., 2018 . In particular, Agarwal et al. [2018] propose an algorithm for fair classification that is very similar to the Lagrangian-based approach that we outline in Section 3-the main differences are our introduction of "shrinking", and that our setting (Equation 1) is more general. The recent work of Chen et al. [2017] addresses non-convex robust optimization, i.e. problems of the form:
Like both us and Agarwal et al. [2018] , they: (i) model such a problem as a two-player game where one player chooses a mixture of objective functions, and the other player minimizes the loss of the mixture, and (ii) they find a distribution over solutions rather than a pure equilibrium. These similarities are unsurprising in light of the fact that robust optimization can be reformulated as constrained optimization via the introduction of a slack variable:
Correspondingly, one can transform a robust problem to a constrained one at the cost of an extra bisection search [e.g. Christiano et al., 2011, Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013] . As this relationship suggests, our main contributions can be adapted to the robust optimization setting. In particular: (i) our proposed shrinking procedure can be applied to Equation 3 to yield a distribution over only m + 1 solutions, and (ii) one could perform robust optimization over non-differentiable (even discontinuous) losses using "proxy objectives", just as we use proxy constraints.
Algorithm 1 Optimizes the Lagrangian formulation (Definition 1) in the non-convex setting via the use of an approximate Bayesian optimization oracle O ρ (Definition 3) for the θ-player. The parameter R is the radius of the Lagrange multiplier space Λ := λ ∈ R m + : λ 1 ≤ R , and the function Π Λ projects its argument onto Λ w.r.t. the Euclidean norm.
OracleLagrangian
Alternative Approaches
Given the difficulties involved in using a Lagrangian-like formulation for non-convex problems, it's natural to ask whether one should instead favor a procedure based on entirely different principles. Unfortunately, the potential alternatives each present their own challenges.
The potential complexity of the constraints all but rules out approaches based on projections (e.g. projected SGD) or optimization of constrained subproblems (e.g. Frank-Wolfe, as in , Jaggi [2013] , Garber and Hazan [2013] ). Similarly, attempting to penalize violations [e.g. Arora et al., 2012 , Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013 , Mahdavi et al., 2012 , for example by adding γ max i∈[m] max {0, g i (θ)} to the objective, where γ ∈ R + is a hyperparameter, and optimizing the resulting problem using a first order method, fails if the constraint functions are non-differentiable. Even if they are, they may still be data-dependent, so evaluating g i , or even determining whether it is positive (as is necessary for such techniques, due to the max with 0), requires enumerating over the entire dataset. Hence, unlike the Lagrangian and proxy-Lagrangian formulations, such "penalized" formulations are incompatible with the use of a computationally-cheap stochastic optimizer.
In response to the idea of proxy constraints, it's natural to ask "why not just relax the constraints for both players, instead of just the θ-player?". This is indeed a popular approach, having been proposed e.g. for Neyman-Pearson classification [Davenport et al., 2010 , Gasso et al., 2011 , more general rate metrics [Goh et al., 2016] , and AUC [Eban et al., 2017] . The answer is that in many cases, particularly when constraints are data dependent, they represent real-world restrictions on how the learned model is permitted to behave. For example, the "80% rule" of Equation 2 can be found in the HOPA Act of 1995 [Wikipedia, 2018] , and it requires an 80% threshold in terms of the number of positive predictions-not a relaxation-which is precisely the target that the proxy-Lagrangian approach will attempt to hit.
This point, in turn, raises the question of generalization: satisfying the correct un-relaxed constraints on training data does not necessarily mean that they will be satisfied at evaluation time. This issue is outside the scope of this paper, but is vital. For certain specific applications, the post-training correction approach of Woodworth et al. [2017] can improve generalization performance, and Cotter et al. [2018] 's more recent proposal (which is based on our proxy-Lagrangian formulation) can be applied more generally, but there is still room for future work.
Starting Point: Lagrangian Optimization
Our ultimate interest is in constrained optimization, so before we present our proposed algorithm for optimizing the Lagrangian (Definition 1) in the non-convex setting, we will characterize the relationship between an approximate Nash equilibrium of the Lagrangian game, and a nearly-optimal nearly-feasible solution to the original constrained problem (Equation 1): 
Defineθ as a random variable for whichθ = θ (t) with probability 1/T , and letλ :=
nearly-optimal in expectation:
and nearly-feasible: max
Additionally, if there exists a θ ′ ∈ Θ that satisfies all of the constraints with margin Proof. This is a special case of Theorem 3 and Lemma 6 in Appendix A.
This theorem has a few differences from the more typically-encountered equivalence between Nash equilibria and optimal feasible solutions in the convex setting. First, it characterizes mixed equilibria, in that uniformly sampling from the sequences θ (t) and λ (t) can be interpreted as defining distributions over Θ and Λ. A convexity assumption would enable us to eliminate this added complexity by appealing to Jensen's inequality to replace these sequences with their averages. Second, for the technical reason that we require compact domains in order to prove convergence rates (below), Λ is taken to consist only of sets of Lagrange multipliers with bounded 1-norm 1 .
Finally, as a consequence of this second point, the feasibility guarantee of Equation 4 only holds if the Lagrange multipliers are, on average, smaller than the maximum 1-norm radius R. Thankfully, as is shown by the final result of Theorem 1, if there exists a point satisfying the constraints with some margin γ, then there will exist Rs that are large enough to guarantee feasibility to within O(ǫ).
Our proposed algorithm (Algorithm 1) requires an oracle that performs approximate non-convex minimization, similarly to Chen et al. [2017] 's algorithm for robust optimization and Agarwal et al. [2018] 's for fair classification (the latter reference uses the terminology "best response"):
can be written as a nonnegative linear combination of the objective and constraint functions
The θ-player uses this oracle, and the λ-player uses projected gradient ascent. Notice that, unlike the oracle of Chen et al. [2017] , which provides a multiplicative approximation, O ρ provides an additive approximation. 
where ρ is the error associated with the oracle O ρ .
Proof. In Appendix C.3.
Combined with Theorem 1, we therefore have that if R is sufficiently large, then Algorithm 1 will converge to a distribution over Θ that is, in expectation, O(ρ)-far from being optimal and feasible at a O(1/ √ T ) rate, where ρ is as in Definition 3.
Shrinking
Aside from the unrealistic oracle assumption (which will be partially addressed in Section 4), the main disadvantage of Algorithm 1 is that it results in a mixture of T models, which presumably would be far too many to use in practice. However, much smaller Nash equilibria exist:
Lemma 2. If Θ is a compact Hausdorff space, Λ is compact, and the objective and constraint functions g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g m are continuous, then the Lagrangian game (Definition 1) has a mixed Nash equilibrium pair (θ, λ) where θ is a random variable supported on at most m + 1 elements of Θ, and λ is non-random.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 5 in Appendix B.
Of course, the mere existence of such an equilibrium is insufficient-we need to be able to find it, and Algorithm 1 manifestly does not. Thankfully, we can re-formulate the problem of finding the optimal ǫ-feasible mixture of the θ (t) s as a linear program (LP) that can be solved to "shrink" the support set. We must first evaluate the objective and constraint functions for every θ (t) , yielding a T -dimensional vector of objective function values, and m such vectors of constraint function evaluations, which are then used to specify the LP:
, and consider the linear program:
where ∆ T is the T -dimensional simplex. Then every vertex p * of the feasible region-in particular an optimal onehas at most m * + 1 ≤ m + 1 nonzero elements, where m * is the number of active p * , g i ≤ ǫ constraints.
Proof. In Appendix B.
This result suggests a two-phase approach to optimization. In the first phase, we apply Algorithm 1, yielding a sequence of iterates for which the uniform distribution over the θ (t) s is approximately feasible and optimal. We then apply the procedure of Lemma 3 to find the best distribution over these iterates, which in particular is guaranteed to be no worse than the uniform distribution, and is supported on at most m + 1 iterates. We'll expand upon this further in Section 5.
Algorithm 2 Optimizes the proxy-Lagrangian formulation (Definition 2) in the convex setting, with the θ-player minimizing external regret, and the λ-player minimizing swap regret. The fix M operation on line 3 results in a stationary distribution of M (i.e. a λ ∈ Λ such that M λ = λ, which can be derived from the top eigenvector). The function Π Θ projects its argument onto Θ w.r.t. the Euclidean norm.
4 Proxy-Lagrangian Optimization
While the Lagrangian formulation can be used to solve constrained problems in the form of Equation 1, Algorithm 1 isn't actually implementable, due to its reliance on an oracle. If one wished to apply it in practice, one would need to replace the oracle with something else, and for large-scale machine learning problems, "something else" is overwhelmingly likely to be SGD [Robbins and Monro, 1951, Zinkevich, 2003] or another first-order stochastic algorithm (e.g. AdaGrad [Duchi et al., 2011] or ADAM [Kingma and Ba, 2014] ).
This leads to the issue we raised in Section 1.2: for non-differentiable constraints like those in the fairness example of Equation 2, we cannot compute gradients, and therefore cannot use a first-order algorithm. "Fixing" this issue by replacing the constraints with differentiable surrogates introduces a new difficulty: solutions to the resulting problem will satisfy the surrogate constraints, rather than the actual constraints.
The proxy-Lagrangian formulation of Definition 2 sidesteps this issue by using a non-zero-sum two-player game. The λ-player chooses how much the θ-player should penalize the (differentiable) proxy constraints, but does so in such a way as to satisfy the original constraints. Unfortunately, since the proxy-Lagrangian game is non-zero-sum, we cannot expect to find a Nash equilibrium, at least not efficiently. However, the analogous result to Theorem 1 requires a weaker type of equilibrium: a joint distribution over Θ and Λ w.r.t. which the θ-player can only make a negligible improvement compared to the best constant strategy, and the λ-player compared to the best action-swapping strategy (this is a particular type of Φ-correlated equilibrium [Rakhlin et al., 2011] (1) , . . . , λ (T ) ∈ Λ be sequences satisfying:
Defineθ as a random variable for whichθ = θ (t) with probability λ
1 , and letλ :=
Thenθ is nearly-optimal in expectation:
Additionally, if there exists a θ ′ ∈ Θ that satisfies all of the proxy constraints with margin γ (i.e.g i (θ
where B g0 ≥ sup θ∈Θ g 0 (θ) − inf θ∈Θ g 0 (θ) is a bound on the range of the objective function g 0 .
Proof. This is a special case of Theorem 4 and Lemma 7 in Appendix A.
Notice that while Equation 6 guarantees feasibility w.r.t. the original constraints, the comparator in Equation 5 is feasible w.r.t. the proxy constraints. Hence, the overall guarantee is no better than what we would achieve if we took g i :=g i for all i ∈ [m], and optimized the Lagrangian as in Section 3. However, as will be demonstrated experimentally in Section 6.2, because the feasible region w.r.t. the original constraints is larger (perhaps significantly so) than that w.r.t. the proxy constraints, the proxy-Lagrangian approach has more "room" to find a better solution in practice.
One key difference between this result and Theorem 1 is that the R parameter is absent. Instead, its role, and that of λ , is played by the first coordinate ofλ. Inspection of Definition 2 reveals that, if one or more of the constraints are violated, then the λ-player would prefer λ 1 to be zero, whereas if they are satisfied (with some margin), then it would prefer λ 1 to be one. In other words, the first coordinate of λ (t) encodes the λ-player's belief about the feasibility of θ (t) , for which reason θ (t) is weighted by λ
1 in the density definingθ. Algorithm 2 is motivated by the observation that, while Theorem 2 only requires that the θ (t) sequence suffer low external regret w.r.t. L θ ·, λ (t) , the condition on the λ (t) sequence is stronger, requiring it to suffer low swap regret [Blum and Mansour, 2007] . Hence, the θ-player uses SGD to minimize external regret, while the λ-player uses a swap-regret minimization algorithm of the type proposed by Gordon et al. [2008] , yielding the convergence guarantee: Proof. In Appendix C.3.
Algorithm 2 is designed for the convex setting (except for the g i s), for which reason it uses SGD for the θ-updates. However, this convexity requirement is not innate to our approach: it's straightforward to design an oracle-based algorithm that, like Algorithm 1, doesn't require convexity 2 . Our reason for presenting the SGD-based algorithm, instead of the oracle-based one, is that the purpose of proxy constraints is to substitute optimizable constraints for unoptimizable ones, and there is no need to do so if you have an oracle.
It turns out that the same existence result that we provided for the Lagrangian game (Lemma 2)-of a Nash equilibrium-holds for the proxy-Lagrangian:
Lemma 5. If Θ is a compact Hausdorff space and the objective, constraint and proxy constraint functions g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g m ,g 1 , . . . ,g m are continuous, then the proxy-Lagrangian game (Definition 2) has a mixed Nash equilibrium pair (θ, λ) where θ is a random variable supported on at most m + 1 elements of Θ, and λ is non-random.
Furthermore, the exact same linear programming procedure of Lemma 3 can be applied (with the g i s being defined in terms of the original-not proxy-constraints) to yield a solution with support size m + 1, and works equally well. This is easy to verify: sinceθ, as defined in Theorem 2, is a distribution over the θ (t) s, and is therefore feasible for the LP, the best distribution over the iterates will be at least as good.
Overall Procedure
The pieces are now in place to propose a complete two-phase optimization procedure, for both convex and nonconvex problems, with or without proxy constraints. In the first phase, we apply the appropriate algorithm to yield a distribution over the T "candidates" θ (1) , . . . , θ (T ) that is approximately feasible and optimal, according to either Theorems 1 or 2. Then, in the second phase, we construct g 0 , g 1 , . . . , g m ∈ R
T by evaluating the objective and constraint functions for each θ (t) , and then optimize the LP of Lemma 3 to find the best distribution over θ (1) , . . . , θ
(which will have support size ≤ m + 1). If we take the ǫ parameter to this LP to be either the RHS of Equation 4 in Theorem 1 (for the Lagrangian case), or of Equation 6 in Theorem 2 (for the proxy-Lagrangian case), then the resulting size-(m + 1) distribution will have the same guarantees as the original.
Practical Procedure: The approach outlined above provably works, but is still somewhat idealized. In practice, we'll dispense with the oracle O ρ -even on non-convex problems-in favor of the "typical" approach: pretending that the problem is convex, and using SGD (or another cheap stochastic algorithm) for the θ-updates 3 . On a non-convex problem, this has no guarantees, but one would still hope that it would result in a "candidate set" of θ (t) s that contains enough good solutions to pass on to the LP of Lemma 3. If necessary, this candidate set can first be subsampled to make it a reasonable size. To choose the ǫ parameter of the LP, we propose using a bisection search to find the smallest ǫ ≥ 0 for which there exists a feasible solution.
Evaluation: The ultimate result of either of these procedures is a distribution over at most m + 1 distinct θs. If the underlying problem is one of classification, with f (·; θ) being the scoring function, then this distribution defines a stochastic classifier: at evaluation time, upon receiving an example x, we would sample θ, and then return f (x; θ). If a stochastic classifier is not acceptable (as is often the case in real-world applications), then one could heuristically convert it into a deterministic one, e.g. by weighted averaging or voting, which is made significantly easier by its small size. Table 2 : Support sizes, test error rates, and "equal opportunity" values for the experiments of Section 6.2. For the constraints, each reported number is the ratio of the positive prediction rate on positively-labeled members of the protected class, to the positive prediction rate on the set of all positively-labeled data. The constraints attempt to force this ratio to be at least 95%-quantities lower than this threshold violate the constraint, and are marked in bold. 
Experiments
We present two experiments: the first, on the robust MNIST problem of Chen et al. [2017] , tests the performance of the "practical procedure" of Section 5 using the Lagrangian formulation (with the norms of the Lagrange multipliers being unbounded, i.e. R = ∞), while the second, a fairness problem on the UCI Adult dataset [Dheeru and Karra Taniskidou, 2017] , uses the proxy-Lagrangian formulation. Both were implemented in TensorFlow 4 .
In both cases, the θ and λ-updates both used AdaGrad with the same initial learning rates. In the proxy-Lagrangian case, however, the λ-update (line 7 of Algorithm 2) was performed in the log domain so that it would be multiplicative. To choose the initial AdaGrad learning rate, we performed a grid search over powers-of-two, and chose the best model on a validation set. In all experiments, the optimum was in the interior of the grid.
Our constrained optimization algorithms result in stochastic classifiers, and we report results for both theθ of Theorems 1 or 2 (in the Lagrangian or proxy-Lagrangian cases, respectively), and the optimal distribution found by the LP of Lemma 3, optimized on the training dataset.
Robust Optimization
In robust optimization, there are multiple objective functions g 1 , ..., g m : Θ → R, and the goal is to find a θ ∈ Θ minimizing max i∈[m] g i (θ). As was discussed in Section 2, this can be re-written as a constrained problem by introducing a slack variable, as in Equation 3.
The task is the modified MNIST problem created by Chen et al. [2017] , which is based on four datasets, each of which is a version of MNIST that has been corrupted in different ways. One would therefore hope that choosing g i to be an empirical loss on the ith such dataset, and optimizing the corresponding robust problem, will result in a classifier that is "robust" to all four types of corruption.
We used a neural network with one 1024-neuron hidden layer, and ReLu activations. The four objective functions were the cross-entropy losses on the corrupted datasets. All models were trained for 50 000 iterations using a minibatch size of 100, and a θ (t) was extracted every 500 iterations, yielding a sequence of length T = 100.
Baselines: For our baselines, we trained the neural network over the union of the four datasets. We report two variants: (i) the "Uniform Distribution Baseline" of Chen et al. [2017] is a stochastic classifier, uniformly sampled over the θ (t) s (like ourθ classifier), and (ii) a non-stochastic classifier taking its parameters from the last iterate θ (T ) .
Results: Table 1 lists, for each of the corrupted datasets, the error rates of the compared models on both the training and testing datasets. Interestingly, although our proposed shrinking procedure is only guaranteed to give a distribution over m + 1 solutions, in these experiments it chose only one. Hence, the "Lagrangian (LP)" model of Table 1 is, like "Baseline (θ (T ) )", non-stochastic.
While we did not quite match the raw performance reported by Chen et al. [2017] 's algorithm, our results, and theirs, tell similar stories. In particular, we can see that both of our algorithms outperformed their natural baseline equivalents.
In particular, the use of shrinking not only greatly simplified the model, but also significantly improved performance.
Equal Opportunity
These experiments were performed on the UCI Adult dataset, which consists of census data including 14 features such as age, gender, race, occupation, and education. The goal was to predict whether income exceeds 50k/year. The dataset contains 32 561 training examples, from which we split off 20% to form a validation set, and 16 281 testing examples.
We dropped the "fnlwgt" weighting feature, and processed the remaining features as in Platt [1998] , yielding 120 binary features, on which we trained linear models. The objective was to minimize the average hinge loss, subject to one 95% equal opportunity [Hardt et al., 2016] constraint in the style of Goh et al. [2016] for each "protected class": g i was defined such that g i (θ) ≤ 0 iff the positive prediction rate on the set of positively-labeled examples for the associated class was at least 95% of the positive prediction rate on the set of all positively-labeled examples.
When using proxy constraints,g i was taken to be a version of g i with the indicator functions defining the positive prediction rates replaced with hinge upper bounds. When not using proxy constraints, the indicator-based constraints were dropped entirely, with these upper bounds being used throughout.
All models were trained for 5 000 iterations with a minibatch size of 100, with a θ (t) being extracted every 50 iterations, yielding a sequence of length T = 100.
Baseline: The baseline classifier was optimized to simply minimize training hinge loss. Since this problem is unconstrained, we took the last iterate θ (T ) .
"Best-model" Heuristic: For hyperparameter tuning using a grid search, we needed to choose the "best" model on the validation set. Due to the presence of constraints, however, the "best" model was not necessarily that with the lowest validation error. Instead, we used the following heuristic: the models were each ranked in terms of their objective function value, as well as the magnitude of the ith constraint violation (i.e. max {0, g i (θ)}). The "score" of each model was then taken to be the maximal such rank, and the model with the lowest score was chosen, with the objective function serving as a tiebreaker.
Results: Table 2 lists the test error rates, (indicator-based) constraint function values on both the training and testing datasets, and support sizes of the stochastic classifiers, for each of the compared algorithms. The "LP" versions of our models, which were found using the shrinking procedure of Lemma 3, uniformly outperformed theirθ-analogues.
We can see, however, that the generalization issue discussed in Section 2.1 caused the proxy-Lagrangian LP model to slightly violate the constraints on the testing dataset, despite satisfying them on the training dataset. The non-proxy algorithms satisfied all constraints, on both the training and testing datasets, because there was sufficient "room" between the hinge upper bound that they actually constrained, and the true constraint, to absorb the generalization error. Inspection of the error rates, however, reveals that the relaxed constraints were so overly-conservative that satisfying them significantly damaged classification performance. In contrast, our proxy-Lagrangian approach matched the classification performance of the unconstrained baseline.
A Proofs of Sub{optimality,feasibility} Guarantees
and consider the Lagrangian of Equation 1 (Definition 1).
Suppose that θ ∈ Θ and λ ∈ Λ are random variables such that:
i.e. θ, λ is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium. Then θ is ǫ-suboptimal: Proof. First notice that L is linear in λ, so:
Optimality: Choose θ * to be the optimal feasible solution in Equation 8, so that g i (θ
, and also choose λ * = 0, which combined with the definition of L (Definition 1) gives that:
which is the optimality claim. 
Then by the definition of a dual norm, Hölder's inequality, and the assumption that λ p < R:
Rearranging terms gives the feasibility claim.
Lemma 6. In the context of Theorem 3, suppose that there exists a θ ′ ∈ Θ that satisfies all of the constraints, and does so with q-norm margin γ, i.e.
Proof. Starting from Equation 7 (in Theorem 3), and choosing θ * = θ ′ and λ * = 0:
Solving for λ p yields the claim. 
, let (Ω, F , P ) be the probability space, and define a random variableθ such that:
In words,θ is a version of θ that has been resampled with λ 1 being treated as an importance weight. In particular
Thenθ is nearly-optimal:
and nearly-feasible:
Notice the optimality inequality is weaker than it may appear, since the comparator in this equation is not the optimal solution w.r.t. the constraints g i , but rather w.r.t. the proxy constraintsg i .
Proof. Optimality: If we choose M * to be the matrix with its first row being all-one, and all other rows being all-zero, then L λ (θ, M * λ) = 0, which shows that the first term in the LHS of the second line of Equation 9 is nonnegative.
by the definition of L λ (Definition 2), and the fact thatg i ≥ g i :
Notice that L θ is linear in λ, so the first line of Equation 9, combined with the above result and the definition of L θ (Definition 2) becomes:
Choose θ * to be the optimal solution that satisfies the proxy constraintsg, so thatg i (θ * ) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ [m]. Then:
which is the optimality claim.
Feasibility: We'll simplify our notation by defining ℓ 1 (θ) := 0 and ℓ i+1 (θ) :
. Consider the first term in the LHS of the second line of Equation 9:
where we used the fact that, since M * is left-stochastic, each of its columns is a (m + 1)-dimensional multinoulli distribution. For the second term in the LHS of the second line of Equation 9, we can use the fact that ℓ 1 (θ) = 0:
Plugging these two results into the second line of Equation 9, the two sums collapse, leaving:
The definition of ℓ i then yields the feasibility claim. 
Proof. Starting from Equation 10 (in the proof of Theorem 4), and choosing θ * = θ ′ :
Solving forλ 1 yields the claim.
B Proofs of Existence of Sparse Equilibria
Theorem 5. Consider a two player game, played on the compact Hausdorff spaces Θ and Λ ⊆ R m . Imagine that the θ-player wishes to minimize L θ : Θ × Λ → R, and the λ-player wishes to maximize L λ : Θ × Λ → R, with both of these functions being continuous in θ and linear in λ. Then there exists a Nash equilibrium θ, λ:
where θ is a random variable placing nonzero probability mass on at most m + 1 elements of Θ, and λ ∈ Λ is non-random.
Proof. There are some extremely similar (and in some ways more general) results than this in the game theory literature [e.g. Bohnenblust et al., 1950, Parthasarathy and Raghavan, 1975] , but for our particular (Lagrangian and proxyLagrangian) setting it's possible to provide a fairly straightforward proof.
To begin with, Glicksberg [1952] gives that there exists a mixed strategy in the form of two random variablesθ andλ:
Since both functions are linear inλ, we can define λ := Eλ λ , and these conditions become:
Let's focus on the first condition. Let p ǫ := Pr L θ θ , λ ≥ ℓ min + ǫ , and notice that p 1/n must equal zero for any n ∈ {1, 2, . . . } (otherwise we would contradict the above), implying by the countable additivity of measures that Pr L θ θ , λ = ℓ min = 1. We therefore assume henceforth, without loss of generality, that the support ofθ consists entirely of minimizers of L θ (·, λ). Let S ⊆ Θ be this support set.
Define G := ∇λL λ (θ ′ , λ) : θ ′ ∈ S , and takeḠ to be the closure of the convex hull of G. Since Eθ ∇λL λ θ , λ ∈Ḡ ⊆ R m , we can write it as a convex combination of at most m + 1 extreme points of G, or equivalently of m + 1 elements of G. Hence, we can take θ to be a discrete random variable that places nonzero mass on at most m + 1 elements of S, and:
and Eθ L λ θ , · are the same function (up to a constant), and therefore have the same maximizer(s). Correspondingly, θ is supported on S, which contains only minimizers of L θ (·, λ) by construction. 
These functions are linear inλ, which is a m-dimensional space, so the conditions of Theorem 5 apply, yielding the claimed result. Proof. The linear program contains not only the m explicit linearized functional constraints, but also, since p ∈ ∆ T , the T nonnegativity constraints p t ≥ 0, and the sum-to-one constraint T t=1 p t = 1. Since p is T -dimensional, every vertex p * of the feasible region must include T active constraints. Letting m * ≤ m be the number of active linearized functional constraints, and accounting for the sum-to-one constraint, it follows that at least T − m * − 1 nonnegativity constraints are active, implying that p * contains at most m * + 1 nonzero elements. 
where θ * ∈ Θ is an arbitrary reference vector.
Proof. Mirror descent [Nemirovski and Yudin, 1983, Beck and Teboulle, 2003 ] dates back to 1983, but this particular statement is taken from Lemma 2 of Srebro et al. [2011] . 
where∇f t (θ) ∈ ∂f t (θ (t) ) is a subgradient of f t at θ, and Π Θ projects its argument onto Θ w.r.t. the Euclidean norm. Then:
Proof. Follows from taking Ψ (θ) = θ where the matrix product on the last line is performed element-wise. This shows that A (t) is a supergradient off t at M (t) , from which we conclude that the final two steps of the update are performing the algorithm of Corollary 2, so:
where the last step follows from the convexity of the f t s. Consider the second term on the RHS. Observe that, sincewith probability 1 − δ over the draws of the stochastic (sub)gradients.
Proof. Applying Corollary 3 to the optimization over θ, and Lemma 9 to that over λ (withm := m + 1), gives that with probability 1 − 2δ ′ over the draws of the stochastic (sub)gradients:
L θ θ * , λ (t) ≤2B Θ B∆ 1 + 16 ln
L λ θ (t) , λ (t) ≤2B ∆ 2 (m + 1) ln (m + 1) 1 + 16 ln 1 δ ′ T Taking δ = 2δ ′ , and using the definitions ofθ andλ, yields the claimed result.
